NEW CHALLENGES FOR JAPAN'S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) POLICY:
HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND AID SANCTIONS

FUMITAKA FURUOKA
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FUMITAKA FURUOKA
DEDICATION

For my alma mater, Soka University, and its founder, Dr. Daisaku Ikeda.
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APP</td>
<td>All People’s Party, Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHN</td>
<td>Basic Human Needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperation for American Relief for Everywhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Cambodian People’s Party</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAEC</td>
<td>East Asian Economic Caucus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Planning Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>EROA</td>
<td>Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eximbank</td>
<td>Export-Import Bank, Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>FILP</td>
<td>Fiscal Investment and Loan Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (of El Salvador)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Financial Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARIOA</td>
<td>Governmental Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>Grant Element</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Grant Share</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGGI</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JETRO</td>
<td>Japan External Trade Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUST</td>
<td>International Movement for a Just World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPNLF</td>
<td>Khmer People’s National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KR</td>
<td>Khmer Rouge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less Developed Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAF</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAFF</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Japan</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industries, Japan
MMD Movement for Multiparty Democracy, Zambia
MNC Multinational Corporation
MOF Ministry of Finance, Japan
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NIF National Islamic Front, Sudan
NLD National League for Democracy
OACA Overseas Agricultural Cooperation Agency
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECF Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
OTCA Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency
PKOs Peace Keeping Operations
POWs Prisoners of War
PPP People’s Progressive Party, Gambia
SALs Structure Adjustment Loans
SDF Self-Defence Forces, Japan
SLORC State Law and Order Recovery Council
SNC Supreme National Council of Cambodia
SPDC State Peace and Development Council
SPLs Sector Program Loans
TYLP Third Yen Loan Program
UN United Nations
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
US United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WHO World Health Organisation
WTO World Trade Organisation
$ Dollar
¥ Yen (Japanese Yen)
# LIST OF IMPORTANT JAPANESE TERMS

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<td>Amae</td>
<td>Dependency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enjo</td>
<td>Aid or Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honne</td>
<td>Real intention or Fundamental objective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gaiko</td>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gaiko Seisho</td>
<td>Diplomatic Bluebook</td>
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<td>Gaimusho</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>Giri</td>
<td>Obligation</td>
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<td>Foramu</td>
<td>Forum</td>
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<td>Jinken</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kaihatsu Enjo</td>
<td>Development Assistance</td>
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<td>Keizai Kyoroku</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>Minshushugi</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
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<td>Nenkan</td>
<td>Almanac</td>
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<td>Okurasho</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>On</td>
<td>Favour</td>
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<td>Seihu Kaihatsu Enjo</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>Soto</td>
<td>Out or Out-group</td>
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<td>Tatemae</td>
<td>Appearance or Superficial principle</td>
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<td>Taiko</td>
<td>Charter</td>
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<td>Tsusansho</td>
<td>Ministry of International Trade and Industries</td>
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<td>Uchi</td>
<td>In or In-group</td>
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<td>Wa</td>
<td>Harmony</td>
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FOREWORD


The purpose of publishing this book is twofold. First of all, it is hoped that this research would contribute to the existing body of knowledge on Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy, especially on aid sanctions. With the end to the Cold War, employment of foreign aid as a means to promote human rights and democracy in aid-receiving countries has become one of the main challenges for Japan's foreign aid policy. Although Japan imposed aid sanctions on aid recipient countries on numerous occasions, there is little systematic and in-depth research on this topic. Thus, this book is one of the primary researches that examine Japan's ODA policy with a special focus on employment of aid sanctions.

Secondly, it is hoped that this book can serve as a supplementary reference book for undergraduate and postgraduate students who take research methodology courses. In order to provide clear-cut examples of research methods to students, this book stresses research methodology and offers a detailed discussion of the research hypotheses and their measurements. Furthermore, well-defined structure and organisation of a social sciences thesis can offer additional insights as to how conceptual framework is constructed and research hypotheses are scientifically tested. Therefore, layout and organization of the original Ph.D. thesis were carefully retained in this book as this allows preserving the inner mechanisms and dynamics of social sciences research process.
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